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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) (2008). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Appellant raises one issue for this court to review, whether the trial erred in 
denying Appellant's motion to strike and to dismiss underlying proceedings for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant fails to include the standard of 
review with supporting authority for this issue as required by Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5). Appellant also fails to provide citations to the record showing that the 
issue was preserved in the trial court or a statement of grounds for seeking review 
of an issue not preserved in the trial court as required by Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5)(A) and (B). Appellee restates or further addresses Appellant's issues as 
follows: 
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly deny Appellant's motion to strike and to 
dismiss underlying proceedings? 
Standard of review: "Ordinarily, the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside 
judgment is reviewed on a deferential, abuse of discretion standard; however, 
determination whether to set aside judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
is reviewed without deference to trial court." 
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Van DerStappen v. Van DerStappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App.,1991). 
Preservation of issue: This issue was raised in Appellant's motion to strike and to 
dismiss underlying proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (R. 205) 
which motion was denied. (R. 222). 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal arises out of a modification of a divorce decree originally issued 
in South Dakota. The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case and the parties 
after conferring with the South Dakota court, and subsequently modified the South 
Dakota decree. Appellant participated in pretrial litigation, the trial, and various 
post-trial motions. Appellant then moved the trial court to dismiss the entire 
proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which motion was denied. This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties Carol Ann Huebner ("Carol") and Derrick Robert LaVoie 
("Derrick") were married on June 14, 1986. (R. 79). 
2. The parties are the parents of one child, Nathan LaVoie, born July 14, 
1993. (R. 79). 
3. The parties were divorced by a decree of divorce issued in the state of 
South Dakota on June 5, 2000. (R.79). 
4. Carol was awarded custody of Nathan in the South Dakota case. (R. 
6). 
5. In August 2005, Carol and Nathan moved to Washington County, 
Utah and have continuously resided in Washington County since that time. (R. 
21). 
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6. The South Dakota decree was filed as a foreign judgment in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in Washington County on July 20, 2007, and was assigned 
to the Honorable Eric A. Ludlow. (R. 1). 
7. On August 14, 2007, Carol filed a motion for transfer of jurisdiction 
and communication between courts. (R. 9). The motion was served on Derrick at 
his address in Arroyo Grande, California. (R. 11). 
8. In her motion, Carol sought to have Utah assume jurisdiction over the 
entire case, and have South Dakota relinquish custody over the entire case. (R. 
16). 
9. Derrick did not oppose the motion and a request to submit for decision 
on the motion was filed on September 7, 2007. (R. 26). 
10. In a handwritten order dated September 17, 2007, Judge Ludlow 
stated that he had spoken with the Honorable Warren G. Johnson in South Dakota 
and that both he and Judge Johnson concurred that jurisdiction over the case should 
be in the Fifth District Court, Washington County, Utah. The order was served on 
Carol's counsel and on Derrick. (R. 29). 
11. On September 13, 2007, Judge Johnson sent a letter to Judge Ludlow 
indicating that he concurred with the motion to transfer jurisdiction. The letter was 
served on Carol's counsel and on Derrick (R. 28). 
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12. On January 25, 2008, Carol filed a petition to modify decree of 
custody, seeking to modify Derrick's child support obligation. (R. 31). 
13. On February 21, 2008, Derrick filed an answer to the petition to 
modify. (R. 58). In his answer, Derrick did not raise the issue of lack of 
jurisdiction. (R. 58). 
14. Following a trial on September 18, 2008, the trial court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 12, 2008. 
15. On December 17, 2008, the trial court entered its order modifying the 
decree of divorce. (R. 95). A judgment for unpaid child support in favor of Carol 
and against Derrick was entered on the same date. (R. 98). 
16. On December 31, 2008, Derrick moved for a new trial. (R. 114). 
17. On May 11, 2009 a hearing was held on Derrick's motion for new 
trial. (R. 171). 
18. On July 22, 2009, the trial court issued its order denying Derrick's 
motion for new trial. (R. 185). 
19. On August 7, 2009, Derrick filed a petition to modify decree of 
divorce. (R. 189). 
20. On August 13,2009, Carol filed her answer to Derrick's petition to 
modify. (R. 202). 
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21. On October 21, 2009, Derrick filed a motion to dismiss and strike 
underlying proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 205). 
22. On December 9, 2009, the trial court issued its order denying 
Derrick's motion to dismiss. (R. 222). 
23. On January 11, 2010, Derrick filed his notice of appeal. (R. 226). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Derrick's Notice of Appeal is Untimely. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the notice 
of appeal be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of 
the entry of the order appealed from. The order denying Derrick's motion to 
dismiss was entered on December 9, 2009. Derrick filed his notice of appeal on 
January 11, 2010, more than 30 days after the entry of the order appealed from. 
In calculating the time for filing a notice of appeal, and determining whether such a 
notice is timely and establishes jurisdiction in the appellate court, "the Court of 
Appeals must be bound by the filing date indicated on the notice of appeal 
transmitted to it by the trial court." Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P. 2d 
1230 (Utah App. 1995). Because his notice of appeal is untimely, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
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II. The Trial Court Properly Ruled that It Had Jurisdiction. 
Derrick cites Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA or the "Act") 
in support of his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the 
South Dakota decree. However, unlike cases in which the issuing court retains 
ongoing jurisdiction over the case, the South Dakota court had relinquished 
jurisdiction over the present case and had transferred jurisdiction over the case to 
the state of Utah and the trial court below. This transfer of jurisdiction was 
accomplished pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-101, etseq. ("UCCJEA"). The trial 
court conferred with the issuing court in South Dakota and determined that 
jurisdiction over the case was properly in Utah, not in Dakota, and jurisdiction was 
transferred accordingly. South Dakota then no longer had jurisdiction over the 
case, and Utah assumed full jurisdiction, taking this case out of the purview of the 
Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Derrick's Notice of Appeal is Untimely. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the notice 
of appeal be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of 
the entry of the order appealed from. The order denying Derrick's motion to 
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dismiss was entered on December 9, 2009. Derrick filed his notice of appeal on 
January 11? 2010, more than 30 days after the entry of the order appealed from. 
Derrick's notice of appeal was due on or before January 8, 2010, in order to be 
timely filed. Derrick's notice of appeal is dated January 8, 2010, but the trial 
court's stamp indicates that it was filed on January 11, 2010. In calculating the 
time for filing a notice of appeal, and determining whether such a notice is timely 
and establishes jurisdiction in the appellate court, "the Court of Appeals must be 
bound by the filing date indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it by the 
trial court." Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P. 2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995). 
The issue of a discrepancy between a dated signature on a notice of appeal 
and the date stamp of the trial court, as it relates to the timeliness of a notice of 
appeal, was addressed in Glezos. In Glezos, a notice of cross-appeal had been 
filed but returned for lack of filing fee. The original date stamp had been whited 
out and the notice had been restamped at the time the filing fee was paid. In 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the court stated as follows: 
Frontier next argues that we should deem its cross-appeal 
timely filed, or excuse its untimeliness. Frontier claims the 
district court originally received and stamped its notice of 
appeal February 2, but that the court later whited out this date 
and mailed the notice back to Frontier's attorney due to a $100 
deficiency in the remitted filing fee. Upon its return with the 
proper fee, the clerk stamped the notice February 8. Frontier 
urges this court to ignore the February 8 stamp and reach the 
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merits of its cross-appeal, claiming it was the court clerk's error 
in imparting mistaken information regarding the filing fee that 
caused the untimely filing. 
This court does not have the authority to do as Frontier 
requests. In State ex rel M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah App.1989), 
we held that "[i]n determining whether a notice of appeal is 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an appellate court, 
this court must be bound by the filing date indicated on the 
notice of appeal transmitted to it by the trial court." Id. at 1288. 
Thus, we are bound by the date stamped on Frontier's notice of 
cross-appeal. 
Further, in State ex rel. M.S., this court emphasized that the 
exclusive procedure for extending the time for filing a notice of 
appeal lies under Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Id. Rule 4(e) provides in relevant part: 
The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good 
cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, [footnote omitted] 
Utah R.App.P. 4(e). Thus, Frontier's remedy upon having its 
notice of cross-appeal returned was to file a motion to extend 
time with the district court. This court cannot consider such 
motions, or grant such extensions, on appeal. *1234 State ex 
rel. M.S., 781 P.2d at 1289. We therefore have no jurisdiction to 
consider Frontier's cross-appeal. 
Glezos, 896 P.2d 1230, 1233 -1234 (Utah App. 1995). 
Because his notice of appeal is untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal. 
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II. The Trial Court Properly Ruled that It Had Jurisdiction. 
Derrick cites the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA or the 
"Act") in support of his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify 
the South Dakota decree. However, unlike cases in which the issuing court retains 
ongoing jurisdiction over the case, the South Dakota court had relinquished 
jurisdiction over the present case and had transferred jurisdiction over the case to 
the state of Utah and the trial court below. This transfer of jurisdiction was 
accomplished pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-101, et seq. ("UCCJEA"). The trial 
court conferred with the issuing court in South Dakota and determined that 
jurisdiction over the case was properly in Utah, not in Dakota, and jurisdiction was 
transferred accordingly. South Dakota then no longer had jurisdiction over the 
case, and Utah assumed full jurisdiction, taking this case out of the purview of the 
Act. 
Further, the Act provides that a court of this state may assert jurisdiction 
over a non-resident if the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by 
consent or by entering general appearance. The Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-
201(l)(b). Derrick entered a general appearance and at no time did he object to the 
Court's jurisdiction. 
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Guidance on this issue is found in Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28. In 
Johnson, the parties stipulated to a divorce and property settlement. Mr. Johnson 
later challenged the divorce decree claiming, among other things, that the trial 
court lack jurisdiction because the parties were never legally married. In affirming 
the denial of Mr. Johnson's motion to vacate, the court stated as follows: 
"Subject matter jurisdiction ... is the authority of the court to 
decide the case." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 38, 100 P.3d 
1177. "The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 
(2003)). Usually, "in order to challenge subject matter 
jurisdiction, [a party is] required to challenge the authority of 
the court to hear the underlying case." Id. 
The concept of subject matter jurisdiction does not embrace all 
cases where the court's competence is at issue. "Where the court 
has jurisdiction over the class of case involved, judgment is not 
void on the ground that the right involved in the suit did not 
embrace the relief granted." Perry v. McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 
679, 682 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Rather, the concept of subject 
matter jurisdiction relates to "the relationship between the claim 
and the forum that allows for the exercise of jurisdiction." 
Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 35, 100 P.3d 1177. Instances where a 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction include when a federal 
court is asked to adjudicate matters of state law with no 
diversity of citizenship, Stephens v. Wal-mart Stores, 2010 WL 
1487213, *2, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35506, *4 (M.D.Ga.2010); 
when a state court is asked to adjudicate a matter of 
administrative law when the parties have not exhausted their 
administrative remedies, Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 
TfTf 9, 11, 44 P.3d 724; or when the statute permitting a party to 
sue another party requires statutory compliance, as with notice 
of claim requirements for suit against governmental entities, 
Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49,120, 26 P.3d 217. In these 
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instances, the court cannot adjudicate the case because it has 
not been given the authority to do so. 
Because parties can raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time 
during a proceeding, it makes sense to cabin the issues that fall 
under the category of subject matter jurisdiction. See Chen, 
2004 UT 82,1[ 36, 100 P.3d 1177 (finding that parties 
mischaracterized their claim as a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction in order to avoid waiver); cf. State v. Norris, 2007 
UT 5, % 9, 152 P.3d 305 (finding that a defendant's 
constitutional challenge to the statute under which he was 
convicted did not raise a challenge to the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction). For this reason, most of our cases that have 
addressed subject matter jurisdiction have considered the 
authority of the court to adjudicate a class of cases, rather than 
the specifics of an individual case. In *1103 Career Service 
Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, for instance, 
we held that the Career Service Review Board (the "Board") 
did not lose subject matter jurisdiction over a career service 
employee as a result of the factual intricacies of the case. 942 
P.2d 933, 941-42 (Utah 1997). A statute clearly gave the Board 
jurisdiction over appeals from reprimand decisions of the 
department of corrections. Id. at 941. Because the Board had 
statutory authority to consider the appeal, we determined that 
the specific facts went to the merits rather than to whether the 
Board had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the 
first place. Id. at 942. We came to a similar conclusion in Chen 
when we held that a challenge to the court's authority to appoint 
an interim CEO in the context of a company dispute did not 
raise an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 2004 UT 82, \ 49, 
100 P.3d 1177. Rather, because the court had the authority to 
hear the underlying dispute, the challenge was more properly 
characterized as a challenge to the court's exercise of its 
equitable powers. Id. \ 50. 
* * 5JC 
The limited definition of subject matter jurisdiction applied in 
other cases differs significantly from our holding in Cajfall, 
where we held that a district court lacks subject matter 
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jurisdiction to adjudicate a divorce if no underlying marriage 
exists. 303 P.2d at 288. Because the district court clearly has 
the authority to adjudicate divorces, looking to the specific facts 
of a particular case is inconsistent with our usual definition of 
subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals in Van Der 
Stappen v. Van Der Stappen points out that the Caffall holding 
is "inconsistent with the generally announced and fundamental 
legal proposition that 'subject matter jurisdiction is the 
authority and competency of the court to decide the case/ 
without which, the court may not validly act." 815 P.2d 1335, 
1339 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (quoting Dep't of Social Servs. v. 
Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). Unlike cases where a 
party has not exhausted its administrative remedies or has failed 
to comply with statutory prerequisites to suit, "[t]he discovery 
that the parties never had a valid marriage [does] not... divest 
the court of its authority to resolve the dispute between them." 
Id. at 1339 n. 8. As a result, the holding in Caffall 
"unnecessarily blurs the distinction between a mistake as to the 
exact nature of the subject matter in dispute and the court's 
ultimate authority and competence to decide the dispute." Id. 
Just as a court adjudicating a contract dispute has the authority 
to determine that no contract exists without losing subject 
matter jurisdiction over the dispute, a court has the authority to 
adjudicate a divorce claim even if the court later determines that 
no marriage ever existed. We therefore overrule our holding in 
Caffall and hold that because courts of general jurisdiction have 
the authority to adjudicate divorces, we will not invalidate a 
divorce decree on the grounds that the "right involved in the 
suit did not *1104 embrace the relief granted." See Perry, 754 
P.2d at 682. 
f 13 In this case, the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate Ms. Johnson's petition for divorce. 
Because Mr. Johnson's motion to vacate the divorce decree 
under rule 60(b) was premised on the erroneous assumption that 
the original district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the divorce, the motion was properly denied. 
Although the district court based its denial of the 60(b) motion 
on other grounds, we are free to affirm the dismissal on any 
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grounds apparent from the record. See First Equity Fed., Inc. v. 
Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, f 11, 52 P.3d 1137. 
Johnson v. Johnson, 234 P.3d 1100, 1102 -1104 (Utah 2010) 
The Holding in Johnson supports the trial court's denial of Derrick's motion 
in the present case. The trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate child support. The 
matter was presented to the trial court and was fully and fairly litigated on the 
merits. The failure of technical compliance with the Act should not serve to 
invalidate the orders of the trial court. 
ORAL ARGUMENT: PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
Appellee does not request oral argument or a published opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in her brief, Appellee requests that this court affirm 
the trial court's denial of Derrick's motion to strike and to dismiss. 
DATED this<2K%ay of August, 2010 
BRINDLEY SULLIVAN 
Brent M. Brindley 
Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellee 
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